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Abstract 18 
This paper explores the relevance of householders’ security of tenure to their 19 
willingness to pay the capital and operational costs for sanitation in low-income 20 
urban areas. When the sanitation norm is self-managed on-site systems, as is the 21 
case in many low-income areas of towns and cities, household investment 22 
decisions in sanitation are inherently linked to tenure security. Based on 23 
evidence gathered in Dakar, Senegal, it is de facto rather than de jure tenure 24 
rights that provide sufficient security for household investment in sanitation. We 25 
make a critical distinction between willingness to invest and willingness to pay for 26 
the capital investment costs and on-going operational servicing costs of 27 
sanitation. Whilst tenants and those with lower tenure security do not invest in 28 
capital infrastructure, they are willing to pay for the operational aspects of 29 
sanitation services. Current formal policy settings and strategies for urban 30 
sanitation tend not to cater for this group; this is a fundamental oversight as 31 
these constitute significant and growing segments of the population. Land tenure 32 
and sanitation issues need to be considered in an integrated way and the capital 33 
and operational costs need to be disaggregated in planning to respond more 34 
effectively to the spending decisions of the urban poor.   35 
 36 
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 2 
This paper addresses how tenure security affects household investment 46 
decisions for urban sanitation. This is achieved through a review of the relevant 47 
literature on sanitation for the urban poor and urban land tenure; the gaps in 48 
knowledge are explored through field studies in Dakar, Senegal. The research 49 
explores different components of tenure: legal tenure, tenure security and tenure 50 
status (i.e. landlord or tenant) and their associated implications for sanitation 51 
development. It seeks to answer what the relationships are between tenure 52 
issues and sanitation and to what extent they affect investment in  on-site 53 
sanitation systems (that is, systems in which the disposal of excreta takes place 54 
on or near the housing plot in the absence of networked sewerage; pit latrines 55 
and septic tanks fall into this category). Throughout the paper an important 56 
distinction is drawn between: capital investment costs that are incurred through 57 
constructing a new latrine or otherwise improving the quality of a sanitation 58 
asset by upgrading; and operating costs which are paid to service the facility, for 59 
emptying the pit or tank and subsequent transport and disposal of the contents.   60 
 61 
To achieve citywide sanitation, understanding the dynamics of tenure i.e. how 62 
residents obtain and keep land and housing, and invest in infrastructure is 63 
critical. Furthermore, the paper argues that failing to take these dynamics into 64 
account results in inappropriate sanitation strategies for a significant, and 65 
growing segment of the population of cities in low and middle-income countries. 66 
 67 
Sub-Saharan Africa presents some of the most critical challenges for improving 68 
sanitation, where population growth exceeds the increase in sanitation coverage. 69 
Between 2004 and 2010 the number of people practising open defecation in 70 
urban areas rose by 3 million and the number serviced by unimproved sanitation 71 
systems rose from 145 to 183 million (WHO/UNICEF,  2012). The projected 72 
demographic trends compound these challenges.  73 
 74 
Tenure is often described as legal – illegal, or formal – informal. However, the 75 
reality is that the majority of housing and land development falls between these 76 
extremes (Payne, 2001). Tenure is contextually embedded and layered through 77 
the primary rights on the land, legal tenure status and  the occupancy status of 78 
the land and the dwellings (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007). Formal land tenure 79 
relates to legal tenure rights recognized by the state land authority. Tenure 80 
security is a more elusive term generally understood to mean a lack of fear of 81 
eviction (UN-HABITAT, 2002). Importantly, and especially in the context of 82 
complex land arrangements, tenure security and formal tenure are one and the 83 
same (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002).  84 
 85 
 86 
Key review findings 87 
 88 
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The prevalence of self-built and self-managed sanitation 89 
Urban government is largely absent from the provision of sanitation services. 90 
Households are increasingly expected to carry the cost burden for their own 91 
sanitation needs. A study of 10 African cities highlighted how the vast majority of 92 
residents are served by small-scale independent providers for their sanitation 93 
services (Collingnon & Vezina, 2000). Furthermore there is little recognition of 94 
the millions of households across the world who invest in sanitation without 95 
subsidy or intervention programs (Jenkins & Sugden, 2006; Evans, Hutton & 96 
Haller, 2004). Factoring self-built household sanitation facilities into planning is 97 
important.  Firstly, to identify appropriate triggers and incentives, there is a need 98 
to understand when and how households invest in their own sanitation. 99 
Secondly, facilities that are self-built may not adhere to conventional design 100 
standards (AECOM & Sandec, 2010) and may risk contaminating   the immediate 101 
environment. Since self-built facilities and small-scale service providers do not 102 
offer a complete solution to urban sanitation provision and alone cannot secure 103 
and maintain public health benefits, there is a need for municipal facilitation and 104 
regulation. However, the discussion in the literature does not distinguish 105 
between spending on capital versus operational cost, nor is the role of land 106 
tenure security addressed as a determinant of decision-making behaviour with 107 
regard to sanitation. 108 
 109 
The paradox of demand-led approaches for sanitation  110 
Marketing based approaches intending to ‘unlock demand’ and stimulate 111 
household investment in sanitation have been promoted in the urban 112 
environment (Budds et al., 2002). For the household, the primary drivers for 113 
improving sanitation are comfort, privacy, safety, convenience, social status and 114 
cleanliness, rather than health.  (Jenkins & Scott, 2007). A fundamental 115 
assumption underpinning sanitation marketing is that an awareness of the 116 
benefits of improved sanitation will translate to investment and changed 117 
behaviour in the target population. There is a significant variation in the ability, 118 
willingness and freedom of  residents to modify their infrastructure (Jenkins & 119 
Scott, 2007). Due to this heterogeneity, critics contest the validity of marketing 120 
approaches for achieving sanitation at scale (Ling et al., 1992; Mulenga & 121 
Fawcett, 2003). 122 
  123 
A lack of affordable urban housing and prevalence of rental housing  124 
By 2025 it is anticipated that 80% of the population of developing countries will 125 
live in urban areas (Mooya & Cloete, 2010). Current political and legal systems 126 
are failing to provide affordable housing and services to meet the land, housing 127 
and basic services needs of these growing populations. This results in one of two 128 
shelter options – informal occupation of land or rental housing. Where land is 129 
limited and land delivery has become commercialized, albeit informally, ‘the 130 
squatter is now a tenant’ (Amis, 1984).  131 
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 132 
Rental housing (both formal and informal) represents 61% of housing in Africa 133 
(UN-HABITAT, 2003). Kumar (2001) argues that rental housing is a viable and 134 
necessary livelihood strategy for both tenants and landlords. Rental real estate is 135 
often understood in its simplest form, whereas the reality of settlements includes 136 
a broad spectrum of living arrangements where the range is defined by the needs 137 
and means of the residents (Satterthwaite, 2005).  At one end of the spectrum 138 
there are self-help landlords who share similar socio-economic characteristics as 139 
the tenants; at the other end, there   exists a form of exploitative and absentee 140 
landlordism that has earned rental a poor reputation (Gulyani & Talukdar, 141 
2008). Despite the prevalence of either form of rental housing, the rental 142 
arrangements and their tenant entities are often neglected in national housing 143 
policies (Kumar, 2001) and wider development discourse (UN-HABITAT, 2003), 144 
particularly  in relation to basic services such as sanitation. 145 
 146 
 Tenure security is a necessary precursor for investment.  147 
Security of tenure as a precursor for household investment is the cornerstone of 148 
the property rights debate (Payne et al., 2007). There is lively deliberation among 149 
scholars whether it is de jure or de facto tenure arrangements that are the 150 
necessary preconditions for housing investments. Proponents of land titling 151 
argue that legal tenure is the precursor and prerequisite for investment in 152 
housing stock (De Soto, 2000). The contrary argument, that tenure legality is not 153 
a necessary precursor for housing investment, is supported by a growing body of 154 
empirical evidence (Van Gelder, 2009; Broegaard, 2005; Durand-Lasserve & 155 
Royston, 2002; Razzaz, 1993). Different forms of tenure security may provide 156 
thresholds for investment, where perceived tenure security in the absence of 157 
legal status is enough by itself to stimulate investment. Improvements to  legal 158 
status can significantly enhance this effect and people can be expected to 159 
consolidate significantly faster when their legal status improves (Van Gelder, 160 
2009). 161 
 162 
Whether it is legal status or more complex socio-economic arrangements in any 163 
given context that constitute tenure security, proponents of the property rights 164 
logic state that the need for security of tenure is ’a common sense conclusion’ 165 
(Choguill, 1999); ’that lack of security of tenure is one of the greatest known 166 
impediments to voluntary resource mobilisation for housing’ (Mayo, 1993) and 167 
’occupation rights are insecure in most slums and so people do not want to invest 168 
when they may be evicted or moved on at any time’ (Kar & Pasteur, 2005). 169 
Mulenga and Fawcett (2003) and Rakodi (1999) argue the relevance of this 170 
debate to sanitation, in that sanitation-marketing approaches fail to meet those 171 
with limited choice or who do not have the incentive to invest  172 
 173 
Gaps in knowledge 174 
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From a review of the sanitation and urban property rights literature the 175 
following knowledge gaps were identified: 176 
 There is no consensus of the impacts of land titling on urban 177 
infrastructure. The situation for sanitation is obscured further as sanitation 178 
is often twinned with water, or in a generic ‘basic services’ bundle, where the 179 
characteristics and inherent implications of improved low cost technologies 180 
such as on-site sanitation are overlooked (Alamasi et al., 2003). 181 
 The distinction between household spending on capital and operational 182 
costs has not been made. Whilst issues of operation and maintenance have 183 
been explored (Sohail et al., 2005), factors that determine the disaggregation 184 
of spending between capital and operational costs have not been explored.  185 
 Tenants and rental housing are neglected in the sanitation discourse 186 
(Gilbert, 2003). In a review of sanitation policy in South Africa, tenant 187 
backyard dwellers were overlooked because the municipality recognized a 188 
plot as one ‘household unit’ despite multiple households being present (Mjoli, 189 
2010). A similar case is reported in the thika tenancies1 of the slums of 190 
Kolkata where sanitation improvement programs have provided two toilets 191 
per plot. It was common for the principal tenant to keep one of the toilets for 192 
their own use, leaving the other to be shared by 200 plot residents. These 193 
examples demonstrate how access to sanitation is being drawn along lines of 194 
tenure and raises questions on the intra-household and intra-plot variation of 195 
tenure and sanitation access.  196 
 Household investment decisions and behaviour. There is a generally a 197 
good understanding of why people want private sanitation. Tenure status is 198 
known to be one of several factors affecting willingness to pay for sanitation. 199 
Others include: income level; existence of piped water supply; existence of 200 
level of payment for sanitation services; and dissatisfaction with existing 201 
sanitary arrangements (Jenkins & Scott, 2007). However, willingness to pay 202 
studies for urban sanitation have focused on offering consumers a choice 203 
between different types of technology as investment decisions in 204 
infrastructure (Whittington et al., 1993; University of Colorado at Boulder, 205 
2012) rather than distinguishing between the different aspects of sanitation 206 
services that could be offered. There is a need for a more nuanced 207 
understanding concerning the decisions of how, when and why households 208 
invest in sanitation. For example, it is not known whether there is a trade-off 209 
between households investing in capital assets (new latrines) as opposed to 210 
improved operational services such as frequency of collection and removal of 211 
                                                        
1 Thika tenancies are where land has been taken over by the government. A thika tenant is given 
rights to build on the plot and sub-let. The plots are often 200-300 square metres and occupied 
by approximately 200 people. 
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the contents of latrine pits and tanks. This distinction is of crucial importance 212 
when it comes to developing city wide strategies for sanitation improvement.  213 
 How to improve citywide service provision at scale? How to provide 214 
services to informal areas has been an on-going dilemma for many 215 
governments. Areas where work is more feasible are likely to be prioritized 216 
by government (Leitmann & Baharoglu, 1998; Aguilar et al., 2007) and there 217 
are strong incentives for governments not to work in informal areas (Evans, 218 
1995). Little is understood about how to approach and manage citywide 219 
sanitation; a key challenge is the limited awareness of policymakers in 220 
relation to the support required for the operational activities of sanitation 221 
such as faecal sludge management and the corresponding need for policy 222 
setting, funding allocation, and enforcement (AECOM & Sandec, 2010). 223 
 224 
Methodology 225 
 226 
Study location 227 
Dakar, Senegal was chosen as the location for the research due to its rapid 228 
urbanization rate, the existence of high density habitats and its innovative 229 
approaches to both sanitation and tenure regularization policies.  The population 230 
of Dakar is estimated at 2.8 million residents with an annual growth rate of 3.1% 231 
(UN-HABITAT, 2008).  232 
 233 
The National Senegal Sanitation Agency (ONAS) was created in 1996 as part of a 234 
major sector reform to assign sanitation to a dedicated agency. ONAS is 235 
responsible for sanitation in urban areas throughout the country. As part of its 236 
overall responsibilities, ONAS managed the program targeting the provision of 237 
sanitation services to low-income populations of peri-urban Dakar (PAQPUD) as 238 
part of a wider strategy the Water and Sanitation Program for the Millennium 239 
(PEPAM) to meet the Millennium Development Goals. The PAQPUD project 240 
included a catalogue of technology options for on-site sanitation and greywater 241 
management, small-bore sewerage networks, public toilets, school sanitation 242 
and three faecal sludge treatment plants targeting 60,000 households in six 243 
years. Considered a success, the PAQPUD was subsequently extended under a 244 
Global Partnership Output Based Aid until 2011, targeting a further 15,100 245 
households. It is unusual for urban sanitation agencies in sub-Saharan Africa to 246 
have responsibility for both sewered and on-site sanitation; a wide range of 247 
options were offered in poor peri-urban areas around Dakar.   248 
 249 
64% of households in Greater Dakar have access to improved sanitation; 39% 250 
have on-site or semi-collective systems and 25% are connected to the sewer 251 
network. The most common sanitation technologies are on-site systems, 252 
typically a pit latrine or septic tank (Hoang-Gia et al., 2004). These facilities are 253 
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regularly serviced for emptying by a range of technologies and services (suction 254 
trucks, tractors with trailers and manual labour). The pit-emptying market in 255 
Dakar comprises both a formal and informal sector, where approximately half of 256 
the pits are emptied manually (Hydroconseil, 2008). Factors which are likely to 257 
lead to a relatively high frequency of pit-emptying include good access to water 258 
supply (76% of households have piped connections which is likely to give rise to 259 
high volumes of greywater) and susceptibility to flooding in low lying areas, for 260 
example in Pikine.   261 
 262 
The department of Pikine of Greater Dakar was selected as the study location 263 
due to the cross section of tenure typologies with a similar age, location in terms 264 
of proximity to the economic centre and the overall regulatory setting. 265 
Approximately half of the residents of the Dakar region reside in Pikine where 266 
the population density is 10,166 inhabitants/km² (Hoang-Gia et al.  2004).  267 
 268 
Formal market real estate mechanisms have failed to meet the housing needs of 269 
Dakar’s growing population, which has led to the proliferation of informal 270 
settlements. As such, the majority of housing development is spontaneous and 271 
self-built, where houses are modified within the occupants’ means and needs 272 
(World Bank, 2002; Precht, 2003). 38% of the Dakar region is classified as 273 
‘informal’ (Precht, 2003) although it is noteworthy that the informal land 274 
delivery mechanisms are well established and mimic formal systems; and many 275 
of the residents of Dakar’s informal settlements enjoy a relatively high level of 276 
tenure security (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007). Provision of basic services to 277 
these informal areas can be problematic and encounters both real and perceived 278 
barriers. Irregular layouts and narrow streets prevent vehicular access; however, 279 
this is often only to pockets of a settlement. 280 
 281 
Sampling and Key Variables 282 
Primary data were collected in relation to tenure status, available sanitation 283 
services and the expenditure by users on different aspects of sanitation services. 284 
The bulk of the data was collected at household level, where the socio-economic 285 
data are particular to each household. This was collected using administered 286 
questionnaires, consisting of both closed and open-ended questions to identify 287 
how tenure and sanitation issues interact and, if so, how tenure influences 288 
households’ sanitation decisions. 289 
 290 
To have a fair representation, four settlement types were identified as planned, 291 
unplanned, regularized (formally spontaneous) and traditional village based on 292 
Dakar’s master plan, the Plan du Director Horizon 2025 (MUAT-DUA, 2001) and 293 
previous studies (Durrand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007).  A representative district 294 
within Pikine for each settlement type was selected by cluster sampling. Within 295 
each district 10 survey zones were randomly selected using aerial survey maps 296 
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(5 for the traditional village due to large concessional housing). A transect walk 297 
randomly selected ten plots from each survey zone. In total 363 households and 298 
340 plots participated in the survey. 299 
 300 
Tenure status was defined by three variables: the settlement typology, the level 301 
of tenure security and the occupancy status (i.e. landlord or tenant headed 302 
households).  For tenure security, proxy indicators were used where the 303 
perception of risk of eviction is a primary indicator (Van Gelder, 2009). For 304 
occupancy status, householders who own the dwelling on either formal or 305 
informal settlements are defined as ‘owners.’ Tenants are defined as those who 306 
pay rent for their dwelling, either with or without a formal contract (Precht, 307 
2003). The survey questionnaire consisted of two parts, using the plot and the 308 
household as the unit of analysis respectively. Plots were categorized (Table 1) 309 
as: i) owner occupier dwelling; ii) owner sharing dwelling with one tenant; iii) 310 
owner sharing dwelling with multiple tenants; and iv) tenant(s) with absent 311 
landlord (Jenkins & Scott, 2007). This approach allowed the intra-plot 312 
characteristics with shared infrastructure to be captured.  313 
 314 
Available sanitation services were also defined by three variables: access to 315 
sanitation, household investment in sanitation infrastructure and household pit-316 
emptying behaviours. Access to sanitation was defined according to categories of 317 
the Joint Monitoring Program: improved (including flush toilets, pit latrine with 318 
cover, VIP); shared; unimproved (basic latrines that do not ensure hygienic 319 
separation of excreta from human contact); and open-defecation (WHO/UNICEF, 320 
2012). Expenditure on sanitation was disaggregated by payment for the 321 
following costs: the initial investment in sanitation infrastructure; maintenance 322 
of the facility including repair and structural changes; and operational costs for 323 
pit-emptying. 324 
 325 
 326 
Results 327 
 328 
Access to sanitation - de facto tenure security matters. 329 
Access to sanitation was measured across all four settlements. The settlement 330 
with the highest coverage of improved private sanitation was in the regularized 331 
area (72.0%), followed by the planned settlement (64.7%), informal settlement 332 
(62.8%) and traditional village (48.9%). In the regularized area, less than half of 333 
the residents who are eligible for a title have actually obtained one; the option of 334 
completing the titling process has been found to be sufficient for obtaining an 335 
adequate level of tenure security (Payne et al., 2007).  336 
 337 
Whilst drawing causality about sanitation developments and tenure is difficult, 338 
the data show the following.  339 
 9 
1. A higher perceived risk of eviction correlates with a lower likelihood of 340 
improved sanitation (Figure 1). The existence of improved sanitation was 341 
unlikely without a (very) low perceived risk of tenure eviction. 342 
2. The length of time a household had been resident also played a role. Shared 343 
sanitation facilities were more common for households who had been resident 344 
for five years or less.  Improved sanitation was more likely for households with 345 
over five years of residency in one place (Figure 2). 346 
 347 
Tenants are lower on the sanitation ladder 348 
Table 2 indicates that   significantly more tenant households shared their 349 
sanitation facility with two or more households: 81.1% of owners had an 350 
improved (private) sanitation facility compared with only 20.6% for tenants. On 351 
average and adjusting for differences in landlord-tenant household sizes, tenants 352 
shared their sanitation facility with 3.2 households (20.4 people) compared to 353 
1.2 households (14.4 people) for owners. These household per sanitation facility 354 
figures are useful to underline the intra-plot dynamics. Whilst tenants enjoy 355 
similar levels of water and electricity coverage, they are markedly lower on the 356 
sanitation ladder than owner households (Table 2). 357 
 358 
Table 1. Summary of tenure status in study areas 359 
Occupational status Dakar-Pikine 
Survey 
sample data 
Owner 58.6% 
Owner with tenant 5.5% 
Owner with multiple tenants 15.2% 
Tenant with absent owner 20.7% 
  
 360 
Table 2 Access to sanitation and other services 361 
Access To Basic Services & Living Standards 
Owner 
Household 
Tenant 
Household 
Household size (5% trimmed mean) 12.01 6.39 
Household total monthly income (median) $281 - $373  $187- $280 
HH Improved (private) sanitation 81.1% 20.6% 
HH Shared sanitation 17.4% 77.3% 
Households per sanitation facility (5% trimmed mean) 1.2 3.2 
Average users per toilet 14.4 20.4 
Households per pit/tank (5% trimmed mean) 1.2 3.4 
Average daily loading on pit/tank (kg) 25.9 39.1 
Mechanical pit emptying 47.6% 32.8% 
Water connection in plot 89.7% 83.5% 
Electricity connection 90.1% 84 .5% 
No. of mobile phones (5% trimmed mean) 3.35 1.76 
No. of TV’s (5% trimmed mean) 1.24 0.62 
‘Poor’ level of habitat 16.2% 27.1% 
 362 
The data for plot composition show that tenant plots with absent landlords had 363 
the lowest levels of improved sanitation (22.7%), compared to 27.3% for mixed 364 
occupancy plots and 91.5% for owner-occupiers. These echo the wider problem 365 
of plots with absent landlords where very little of the capital generated by the 366 
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rental sector is reinvested into the housing stock. Tenants cited absent, unwilling 367 
or financially constrained landlords as barriers to improve their sanitation.  368 
 369 
Who pays for the initial investments? 370 
Both the tenant and landlord groups place the onus of responsibility on the 371 
landlord for capital investment in, and repairs to, infrastructure. Owners who 372 
had constructed the first toilet of their current dwelling (N=183) were asked if 373 
they recalled a trigger for the construction. Of those who could, the primary 374 
factors were ‘modesty’ and concurrence with other household construction 375 
activities (Table 3). Construction events were commonly the extension of the 376 
dwelling and rebuilding with permanent building materials. 377 
 378 
Table 3: Initial capital investment trigger for household sanitation 379 
 
Female headed 
household 
Male headed 
household 
Total 
 N Valid % N Valid % n Valid % 
Modesty 
 
7 31.8% 22 31.4% 29 31.5% 
Toilet built at the same time as 
other household construction 
 
8 36.4% 17 24.3% 25 27.2% 
To be independent and not 
disturb neighbours 
 
3 13.6% 13 18.6% 16 17.4% 
Importance of a toilet for a 
Muslim household 
0 0.0% 9 12.9% 9 9.8% 
TOTAL  18 22.8% 61 77.2% 79 100.0% 
 380 
Who pays for maintenance? 381 
Structural changes or improvements were made by 183 households to their 382 
sanitation infrastructure. The primary reason for modification was found to be 383 
essential repair when the facility showed signs of severe defects that prevented 384 
continued use, most often relating to pit collapse (Table 4). The distribution of 385 
the repairs was found to be more heavily concentrated in the informal and 386 
spontaneously occupied zones that are flood-prone.  387 
 388 
Table 4: Why people invest in existing household sanitation 389 
Why people invest in their existing household sanitation  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Essential repair (pit collapsed or imminent risk of collapse / 
severe malfunction) 
76 41.5% 
Improve comfort or usability  29 15.8% 
Poor operation (frequent emptying, blockages) 23 12.6% 
project (PAQPUD/subsidy) stimulus 19 10.4% 
Household enlargement (family / tenants) 18 9.8% 
Home reorganization / new construction /newly move in 17 9.3% 
Total responses 183 100.0% 
 11 
 390 
Who pays for operational Costs? 391 
Tenants and landlords agreed that, regardless of ownership, it is ‘users’ who pay 392 
latrine pit-emptying charges. From the households surveyed, the mechanical pit 393 
emptying service costs an average of 23,500 CFA ($44) and manual emptying 394 
costs 12,500 CFA ($23). Owners tended to prefer mechanical emptying whereas 395 
tenant households preferred manual emptying, either by employing a service 396 
provider to dig out the contents or by doing it themselves (Table 5). It is 397 
noteworthy that the vacuum tankers of Dakar cannot remove the solids whereas 398 
manual emptying offers a full emptying service and therefore a longer lifespan. 399 
67.5% of all pits surveyed are being emptied at least once a year with an 400 
annualized average cost per household of 29,490 CFA ($55) for mechanical 401 
emptying and 13,681 CFA ($26) for manual emptying. It is understood that the 402 
high emptying frequency is due to high pit loading including household 403 
greywater. Although it is hard to confirm on a case by case basis, local experts 404 
believe many of the septic tanks in Dakar are unsealed and therefore potentially 405 
subject to water infiltration. 406 
 407 
Table 5: Emptying service by tenure status 408 
  Owner Tenant Total 
Mechanical 
Emptying 
Count 94 21 115 
% within emptying 81.7% 18.2% 100.0% 
% within tenure status 50.0% 34.4% 46.2% 
Manual emptying 
– (contractor) 
Count 53 31 84 
% within emptying 63.1% 36.9% 100.0% 
% within tenure status 28.2% 50.8% 33.7% 
Manual emptying 
– by householder 
Count 41 9 50 
% within emptying 82.00% 18.0% 100.0% 
% within tenure status 21.8% 14.8% 20.1% 
 Total Count 188 61 249 
 409 
Interestingly, whilst tenants were opting for a cheaper manual service they were 410 
less likely to empty the pit themselves. In doing so, tenant households have 411 
demonstrated their on-going willingness to pay for operational costs of sanitation 412 
services. 413 
 414 
Both landlord and tenant respondents were asked to state the reasons for 415 
choosing a particular type of pit-emptying service. Financial reasons and a 416 
preferred/satisfactory service ranked the highest (Table 6 ).  417 
 418 
Table 6: Decision factors for preferred emptying 419 
Priority 
Rank 
Decision factors for preferred 
emptying 
Owner /occupiers Tenants 
1. Financial  35.3% 48.2% 
2. Preferred/satisfactory service 31.5% 35.7% 
3. Cleanliness 31.0% 17.9% 
4. Not to annoy neighbours 30.4% 16.1% 
 420 
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Whilst there was a difference between how landlords and tenants chose to empty 421 
their pits, interestingly no significant difference was found regarding tenure 422 
security. This implies that operational sanitation services such as emptying may 423 
be neutral regarding differences in tenure security. 424 
 425 
Implications for urban sanitation strategies 426 
 427 
Tenure security matters for household investment in sanitation 428 
This research has shown that low-income residents can, and do, progressively 429 
invest in the capital cost of their own sanitation infrastructure; however this was 430 
only found with owners who enjoyed relatively good tenure security. Tenant 431 
households or those with lower levels of tenure security were less likely to 432 
invest. This confirms that residents have the agency to progressively improve 433 
their own infrastructure and do so upon a basis of tenure security, thus implying 434 
a parallel development between housing and infrastructure (Choguill, 1999). The 435 
study also suggests that where sanitation is an on-plot independently managed 436 
infrastructure, it is de facto rather than de jure tenure security that is a necessary 437 
but sufficient precursor to household investment in sanitation. This argument is 438 
underpinned by two essential facts: firstly, in the developing world context 439 
tenure security and legal tenure are not necessarily the same (Durand-Lasserve & 440 
Royston, 2002) and secondly, non-networked sanitation e.g. a pit latrine or 441 
septic tank, constitutes improved sanitation (WHO/UNICEF, 2012).  442 
 443 
These findings imply that sanitation development in low-income areas can be 444 
linked to housing and fundamentally, de facto tenure security matters for 445 
household investment in sanitation.  446 
 447 
Willingness to invest vs. willingness to pay  448 
In the absence of government service provision it is the households themselves 449 
that assume the role of service provider. When sanitation is an on-plot system 450 
requiring emptying, as is the norm in Dakar and most African cities, the 451 
difference between a household’s willingness to invest in a sanitation fixed-asset 452 
and pay for a sanitation service becomes pertinent.  453 
 454 
These nuances become clearly illustrated in the case of absent landlords. Tenants 455 
and landlords surveyed agreed that structural changes to the dwelling (including 456 
sanitation) are the landlord’s responsibility. The onus of responsibility of 457 
sanitation service provision often falls to the landlord although there is little 458 
incentive or enforceable legal framework to incite them to adopt this role 459 
(Schaub-Jones, 2009). For landlords, a private toilet facility has little effect on the 460 
potential rental turnover (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008). Tenants are averse to 461 
investment as they are not able to reap the benefits of any long-term investment 462 
(Gilbert, 2003). Tenants also often lack the agency to improve their sanitation 463 
facility. Under informal rental agreements, timely and complete payments of rent 464 
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guarantee the tenants’ tenure security (Schaub-Jones, 2009).  465 
 466 
Whilst tenants do not have the willingness or ability to invest, tenants are willing 467 
to pay for sanitation services. This is demonstrated in this research by the 468 
regular pit emptying, at considerable cost, to ensure their sanitation facility 469 
remains operational. 470 
 471 
These landlord-tenant dynamics provide valuable insights into the payment and 472 
investment logic of those without tenure security. What is clearly emerging is 473 
that there are significant differences in what households are both able and 474 
willing to pay. Willingness to pay can, and indeed for sanitation should, be 475 
disaggregated into willingness to invest in an asset, and willingness to pay for a 476 
service, in addition to the differences between ability to change infrastructure and 477 
affordability of sanitation. These nuances are often overlooked in the 478 
development of city sanitation strategies.  479 
 480 
Implications for urban professionals and government 481 
Urban sanitation strategies focus primarily on capital investment in new latrines.  482 
This is a disconnection between strategy and the reality of urbanization where 483 
significant and growing segments of the population lack tenure security. 484 
The vast majority of the sanitation services for residents of low-income areas are 485 
provided by small-scale independent providers. This presents a complex 486 
challenge to utilities and municipal governments who are organized 487 
conventionally to manage utility-based service provision such as sewerage. On 488 
the other hand, on-site systems served by independent service providers 489 
interface with households in a very different way via a demand-responsive pay-490 
as-you-go service. Whilst utilities cite barriers preventing their operation and 491 
service in informal areas, independent providers not only overcome these 492 
barriers but thrive due to their flexibility and their responsiveness to demand 493 
(Collignon & Vézina, 2000). Moreover, as the findings of this study have shown, 494 
households can engage with the latter regardless of where they live, whether 495 
they are a landlord or a tenant, and their level of tenure security. Operational 496 
sanitation services are tenure neutral. 497 
 498 
This suggests that for populations where tenure insecurity is acting as a 499 
disincentive to household investment, the focus of sanitation developments 500 
needs to change. There is a need for more broadly based sanitation service 501 
provision, including non-networked systems and a greater emphasis on 502 
operational activities rather than solely investment in physical infrastructure.  503 
 504 
Government has a pivotal role in creating and enforcing an enabling and 505 
regulatory environment for operational sanitation activities. This research has 506 
found that whilst there may be vast segments of urban populations who are 507 
 14 
unwilling to invest the capital costs, they are willing to pay for the operational 508 
costs of  sanitation services. A concrete recommendation is to use this finding to 509 
segment the population. For those who are willing to pay for operational services 510 
rather than capital investment, feasible mechanisms towards citywide sanitation 511 
are to support the operational activities of collection, transport and safe disposal 512 
of the faecal sludge. These activities provide a tenure-neutral mechanism for 513 
municipal service provision to find interfaces with residents of informal areas – 514 
without encountering compromising situations of consolidating state 515 
infrastructure in informal settlements. In short, citywide sanitation strategies 516 
need to respond in a way that accounts for the investment logic of residents.  517 
  518 
Conclusions 519 
The study has found that de facto tenure security is a sufficient but necessary 520 
precondition for household capital investment in sanitation. Equally important is 521 
the finding that tenants and those lacking tenure security, whilst they are 522 
unlikely to be willing  to invest in the capital cost of latrines, do pay substantial 523 
fees to service providers for operational sanitation services such as the emptying 524 
of full pits and tanks and the removal and disposal of their contents. These 525 
operational investments are not accounted for in formal policy settings. Tenure 526 
status is associated with a much greater disparity in the level of service for 527 
sanitation than it is for either water supply or electricity.    528 
 529 
 Few urban sanitation strategies make this important distinction between 530 
willingness to pay for operational as opposed to capital costs to cater for those 531 
who are unwilling or unable to invest. This is a fundamental oversight in current 532 
sanitation strategies for the population segments who cannot invest, thus failing 533 
to provide a sanitation strategy for all. This is of growing concern given the type 534 
of urbanization being witnessed in developing countries which is characterized 535 
by increasing concentrations of low income populations and tenants. Urban 536 
sanitation strategies therefore need to distinguish between willingness to invest, 537 
willingness to pay and ability to pay. Those who are unwilling to invest in capital 538 
costs may be willing to pay for operational costs of sanitation services.  539 
 540 
The effect of tenure issues on household sanitation decisions in turn implies that 541 
there is a need for a broader sanitation service provision, including non-542 
networked systems and a greater emphasis on supporting downstream activities 543 
associated with faecal sludge management. Currently few interfaces actually 544 
connect the city with the majority of the population, especially the poor. 545 
Sanitation provision happens largely under the radar of formal city planning and 546 
urban management via multiple formal or informal service providers. Policy and 547 
strategic planning for sanitation needs to embrace the issues of operational costs 548 
and tenure security  and be integrated into wider city development strategies in 549 
cities such as Dakar.     550 
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 552 
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Figure 1. Sanitation status and the perceived risk of eviction 682 
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Figure 2.  Access to sanitation by type and duration of residency  690 
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Reviewer 1 Action taken 
2. Inclusion of 'on-site sanitation' as a keyword would 
be useful 
Done 
3. it would be useful to: 
- Define what the phrase 'on-site services' covers early 
in the article 
 
Done: lines 54-56  
- Provide some background on the relatively good 
access to sanitation in Dakar because of massive 
investments in infrastructure (EU, AFD and USAIND 
funded) and subsidies under the World Bank funded 
PAQPUD 
Done: section “Methodology:  study location” expanded 
with new para on institutional background 
Lines 234-248    
- Under the projects listed above, a wide range of 
sanitation options, especially on-site sanitation were 
offered in poor peri-urban areas around Dakar. This is 
important because open defecation and use of public 
toilets appears to be rare (likely because of the 
incentives and subsidies available under the projects) 
and MAY BE LESS ACCEPTABLE because a high 
percentage of households have on-site sanitation. 
Done:  
The wide range of options is described (Lines 241-244) 
Access figures for sanitation in Dakar are quoted 
(Lines 250-253) 
 - The National Senegal Sanitation Agency (ONAS), 
unlike the norm (urban government is largely absent 
from the provision of sanitation services), is 
responsible for both - piped sewerage and on-site 
sanitation. 
Done 
Lines 246-248  
-. There is need for including factors that influence the 
frequency of emptying septic tanks/ operational costs 
in parts of Dakar e.g.: 
   - About 95 percent of the population has good access 
to water (76 percent to piped water, 19 percent to 
community stand-pipes, and only 5 percent through 
vendors or wells).  
   - The frequent and severe flooding in many of the 
poorest districts of Pikene and Rafisque. 
Done 
Lines 257-261 
4. The Study location: The statement "Dakar, Senegal 
was chosen as the location for the research due to its 
rapid urbanisation rate, the existence of high density 
habitats and its innovative approaches to both urban 
sanitation and tenure regularisation policies" is not 
substantiated by some description of the innovative 
approaches to urban sanitation and tenure 
regularisation. 
Done 
The new para referred to above (Lines 234-248) 
highlight the innovative approaches adopted by the 
government agencies   
5. Language  
- Frequent use of the term 'urban' in a sentence is not 
required/ distracting e.g. page 2 
Done 
The use of the term „urban‟ has been edited out other 
than where it is essential in order to retain the sense of 
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the narrative  
- When the sanitation norm is self-managed on-site 
systems, as is the case in many low-income areas of 
(???) towns and cities, household investment decisions 
in sanitation are inherently linked to tenure security 
Done: Line 22 
 (thank you for spotting this) 
- To achieve citywide sanitation, understanding the 
dynamics of tenure i.e. how residents obtain and keep 
land and housing, and invest in infrastructure is critical. 
Furthermore, the paper argues that failing to take these 
dynamics into account results in inappropriate urban 
sanitation strategies for a significant, and growing 
segment of the urban population of cities in low and 
middle-income countries. 
Done 
Lines 65-66 redrafted  
 
- At one end of the spectrum there are self-help 
landlords who share similar socio-economic 
characteristics as the tenants. On the other hand, there 
is also a form of exploitative and absentee landlordism 
that has earned rental a poor reputation (Gulyani & 
Talukdar, 2008). 
Done  
Lines 138-140 redrafted 
- There is a significant variance in ability, will and 
freedom of the urban residents to modify their 
infrastructure .. 
Done 
Lines 118-120 redrafted 
- It was common for the principal tenant to keep one of 
the toilets for their own use, leaving the other for 
shared usage between 200 plot residents. 
Done 
Lines 192-193 redrafted 
 
- For occupancy status, householders who own the 
dwelling on either formal or informal settlements are 
considered 'owners.' 
Done 
Line 306 redrafted 
 
6. Primary data were collected in relation to tenure 
status, available sanitation services and the 
expenditure by users on different aspects of sanitation 
services. Is this clearly elaborated???? 
 
Done 
Clarified by redrafting Lines 301-303, Lines 315; 
addition of lines 321-324 
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Results: Table 1 should be part of the Result and not 
the Method. Again the statistics in Table 1 are not clear 
enough as the total percentage figures exceed 100%. 
And yet the impression given is that the sample size 
(100%) was segregated into the TENURE echelons 
(status or levels) in the study area. Also figures 1 and 2 
are repeated.  Nevertheless, the results are logically 
well explained. 
Done 
Table 1 moved to results section (Line 359) 
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Table 1 amended to show only the tenure echlons, 
values add up to 100% (a sub category had 
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